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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 of 
2010 introduced the most sweeping reforms of financial markets since the 
Great Depression.  Nestled among its numerous provisions was the 
amendment to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
expressly authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
adopt rules for shareholders to nominate directors to the boards of reporting 
companies.2  Financial institutions had long lobbied the SEC for a rule 
providing shareholders access to the nominating process of publicly held 
corporations.3  Their cause gained momentum with a 2003 SEC staff report 
recommending that large, long-term holders, under very limited 
circumstances, should have the right to nominate a minority of the directors 
to be elected.4  After that report, a battle royal ensued, a pro-access chairman 
was terminated, and under the new SEC chairman, the SEC sidetracked 
shareholder access and even curbed the institutions’ access to the proxy 
machinery as a means to authorize shareholder nominations to the board.5  
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1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
2. Id. § 971.  The amendment provided: 
  (2) The rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission under paragraph (1) 
may include— 
 (A) a requirement that a solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorization 
by (or on behalf of) an issuer include a nominee submitted by a shareholder to 
serve on the board of directors of the issuer; and 
 (B) a requirement that an issuer follow a certain procedure in relation to 
a solicitation described in subparagraph (A). 
Id. 
3. See, e.g., S.E.C. Sued Over Board Nomination Rule for Investors, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Sept. 30, 2010, 4:26 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/s-e-c-sued-over-board-
nomination-rule-for-investors (highlighting the lobbying efforts of public pension funds). 
4. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,787 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003). 
5. The SEC interpreted its shareholder proposal provision, Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(i)(8) (2005), to permit companies to omit a bylaw proposal setting forth a procedure by which 
stockholders could nominate directors because the proposal related to the election of directors.  Am. 
Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2006).  The Second Circuit 
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Then, with the imprimatur of Dodd-Frank,6 the SEC acted, albeit timidly, to 
provide, in Rule 14a-11, a process for limited shareholder board nominations.  
In broad overview, Rule 14a-11 permitted a shareholder or group of 
shareholders that held at least three percent of the voting power for over three 
years to nominate a maximum of twenty-five percent of the board.7  
Institutions rejoiced, but only briefly; Rule 14a-11 never became operative.  
The rule was immediately challenged, and the SEC suspended its effect until 
the legal dispute was resolved.8 
In Business Roundtable v. SEC,9 the D.C. Circuit ultimately invalidated 
Rule 14a-11, holding that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
adopting it.10  In so ruling, the D.C. Circuit followed a now familiar path of 
invalidating SEC rulemaking efforts on the ground that the SEC failed to 
meet the review standard11 (hereinafter Review Standard), which mandates 
that “the Commission shall . . . consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”12  Previously this provision was invoked by the D.C. 
Circuit to invalidate SEC rules calling for seventy-five percent of a registered 
 
Court of Appeals rejected the SEC’s position.  Id. at 129–30.  Thereupon the SEC amended the rule 
to expressly authorize excluding a proposal if it “relates to a nomination” of a director.  Shareholder 
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,456 (Dec. 11, 2007) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240).  Earlier the SEC had proposed two conflicting approaches regarding shareholder 
nominations.  Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,466 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (creating a device to 
allow inclusion of shareholder proposals in a company’s proxy statement); id. at 43,487 (proposing 
an amendment to proxy rules that would exclude shareholder proposals from the company’s proxy 
statement “[i]f the proposal relates to a nomination or an election for membership on the company’s 
board of directors or analogous governing body or a procedure for such nomination or election”).  
States have not been idle in this debate.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (2011) 
(authorizing bylaws providing for the nomination of directors by shareholders and reimbursement of 
such nominees’ election expenses); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.06(c) (2010) (providing for 
authorization of the same).  Cf. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 
2008) (holding a stockholder-proposed bylaw calling for reimbursement of an insurgent’s 
reasonable proxy expenses was a proper subject for shareholder action because it related to the 
process of carrying out the limited shareholder franchise). 
6. See infra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
7. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange 
Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,674–75 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
8. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9151, 
Exchange Act Release No. 63,109, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,462, 75 Fed. Reg. 
64,641, 64,641 (Oct. 20, 2010) (announcing that effective and compliance dates for amendments to, 
inter alia, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 would be indefinitely delayed until further notice). 
9. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
10. Id. at 1156. 
11. Id. at 1148. 
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006).  The three other major 
securities laws administered by the SEC contain the same Review Standard.  See Securities Act of 
1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(c) (2006); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (2006). 
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mutual fund board, including the board chairman, to be independent of the 
fund’s investment advisor,13 and classifying so-called fixed indexed annuities 
so that they would no longer enjoy an exemption from the Securities Act.14 
In holding that the SEC failed to fulfill the statutory Review Standard 
when considering the impact of Rule 14a-11 on efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation, Business Roundtable summarized the SEC’s faults as 
follows: 
Here the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the 
costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain 
costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected 
to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to 
respond to substantial problems raised by commenters.15 
It is not our purpose here to disagree with any of these evidentiary 
conclusions.  What we report here is that the level of review invoked by the 
D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable and its earlier decisions is dramatically 
inconsistent with the standard enacted by Congress.  Our conclusion is that 
the D.C. Circuit has assumed for itself a role opposed to the one Congress 
prescribed for courts reviewing SEC rules. 
I. The Review Standard According to the D.C. Circuit 
Business Roundtable is distinctive in its close review of the SEC’s 
failings in the agency’s consideration and adoption of Rule 14a-11.  We 
summarize in this paragraph the most notable points raised in Judge 
Ginsburg’s opinion.  We do this to provide a fully textured understanding of 
what the D.C. Circuit believes is required by the mandate that the SEC 
consider a rule’s impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.  
Rising from a close review of the decision is the D.C. Circuit’s view that 
SEC rulemaking must attempt, if not complete, an accurate cost–benefit 
determination.  Thus, Judge Ginsburg faults the SEC’s cost–benefit 
assessments because they “had no basis beyond mere speculation”16 or 
because the SEC failed “to estimate and quantify the costs it expected 
companies to incur.”17  Based on these identified failings, the D.C. Circuit 
observed that “the Commission has not sufficiently supported its conclusion 
that increasing the potential for election of directors nominated by 
shareholders will result in improved board and company performance and 
 
13. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  The D.C. Circuit 
heard a second challenge to the same rule, but that decision did not apply or analyze the statutory 
Review Standard regarding efficiency, competition, and capital formation.  See Chamber of 
Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that the focus was on whether the 
Commission relied on material not in the rulemaking record in deciding not to modify the rule). 
14. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
15. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49. 
16. Id. at 1150. 
17. Id. 
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shareholder value.”18  In areas where the SEC discounted the costs associated 
with its rule, the D.C. Circuit condemned that reasoning as “illogical and, in 
an economic analysis, unacceptable.”19  A good illustration of the opinion’s 
requirement that costs and benefits be assessed is its rebuke of the SEC for 
failing to consider, “[i]n weighing the rule’s costs and benefits,” the extent to 
which the new rule would “take the place of traditional proxy contests.”20  As 
the court explained, “[w]ithout this crucial datum, the Commission has no 
way of knowing whether the rule will facilitate enough election contests to 
be of net benefit.”21 
Until very recent years, SEC-adopted rules enjoyed a blissful existence 
before the D.C. Circuit.22  The turning point came in 2005 when, in Chamber 
of Commerce v. SEC,23 the Chamber challenged rules the SEC adopted under 
the Investment Company Act that exempted otherwise prohibited 
transactions if at least seventy-five percent of a mutual fund’s board of 
directors, and the board’s chair, were independent.24  The SEC broadly stated 
that it did not expect the exemption “to have a significant effect on 
efficiency, competition and capital formation” in light of the fact that “many 
funds [had] already adopted the required practices.”25  The SEC did 
acknowledge that the rule would entail quantifiable costs, but it was 
confident there would be unquestionable benefits.26 
Chamber of Commerce, another opinion authored by Judge Ginsburg, 
held that the SEC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) with 
regards to considering the costs of the new rules.27  For both rules, the SEC 
 
18. Id. at 1151. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 1153. 
21. Id. (emphasis added). 
22. This view of the quiet life the SEC earlier enjoyed before the D.C. Circuit has been 
previously explored by one of the authors.  See James D. Cox, Premises for Reforming the 
Regulation of Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 37–39 (2000) 
(noting that with the exception of an earlier decision on another matter by the Business Roundtable, 
“[f]ew decisions have seriously questioned the validity of an SEC rule”).  We distinguish the cases 
discussed in this article from the earlier reversal the SEC suffered in Business Roundtable, which 
held that the SEC lacked the substantive authority to impose a one-share, one-vote requirement for 
public companies.  Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  None of the cases 
reviewed here held that the SEC lacked the substantive authority to regulate the matter at issue. 
23. 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
24. Id. at 136–37.  The SEC enacted these rules, by a split vote of three to two, under the 
Investment Company Act.  See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,378, 46,390 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 270) (adopting amendments to the Investment Company Act over the dissent of two 
commissioners). 
25. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,388. 
26. See id. at 46,386–87 (analyzing the costs and benefits of the amendments to the Investment 
Company Act). 
27. See Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144 (“In sum, the Commission violated its 
obligation under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c), and therefore the APA, in failing adequately to consider the 
costs imposed upon funds by the two challenged conditions.”). 
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stated, as part of its announcement of the final rules, that it would be difficult 
to quantify the potential costs for a fund to comply.28  The court stated that 
this uncertainty did “not excuse the Commission from its statutory obligation 
to determine as best it can the economic implications of the rule it has 
proposed.”29  The court reasoned that “uncertainty . . . does not excuse the 
Commission from its statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise itself—
and hence the public and the Congress—of the economic consequences of a 
proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt the measure.”30  Thus, 
the court held that “the Commission violated its obligation under [the 
Investment Company Act], and therefore the APA, in failing adequately to 
consider the costs imposed upon funds by the two challenged conditions.”31 
Significantly, the D.C. Circuit in Chamber of Commerce faulted the 
SEC for its failure to consider, as suggested in dissents by two 
commissioners, disclosure of director independence in place of mandating 
independence.32  The court, however, qualified this basis for faulting the SEC 
by characterizing the alternative of disclosure as “a familiar tool in the 
Commission’s tool kit.”33  On the other hand, the SEC obtained a potentially 
significant victory; the court quickly dismissed the Chamber’s argument that 
the SEC was required either to develop new data to support its rule, or to 
fully consider each of the empirical studies before it as a result of the 
voluminous comments filed during the proposal process.34  Thus, the court 
concluded that the SEC is under no obligation to premise its rulemaking on 
empirical findings.35  The court also noted that the Commission’s failure to 
 
28. See id. at 143 (“With respect to the 75% independent director condition, the Commission 
. . . claimed it was without a ‘reliable basis for determining how funds would choose to satisfy the 
[condition] and therefore it [was] difficult to determine the costs associated with electing 
independent directors.’ . . .  With respect to the costs of the independent chairman condition, 
counsel maintains the Commission ‘was not aware of any costs associated with the hiring of staff 
because boards typically have this authority under state law, and the rule would not require them to 
hire employees.’” (citations omitted)). 
29. Id. (emphasis added). 
30. Id. at 144. 
31. Id.  To support its conclusion, the court cited to a single case—its own decision in Public 
Citizen v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004)—for the 
proposition that, even in the “face of uncertainty, [an] agency must ‘exercise its expertise to make 
tough choices about which of the competing estimates is most plausible, and to hazard a guess as to 
which is correct, even if . . . the estimate will be imprecise.’”  Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 
143 (quoting Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1221). 
32. See Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144 (“We conclude the Commission’s failure to 
consider the disclosure alternative violated the APA.”). 
33. Id. 
34. See id. at 142 (“[A]lthough we recognize that an agency acting upon the basis of empirical 
data may more readily be able to show it has satisfied its obligations under the APA, . . . we are 
acutely aware that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every action upon empirical 
data . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
35. See id. at 142–43 (holding that the Commission did not violate the APA by declining to 
conduct its own empirical study or by failing to closely consider a study offered to it via the notice-
and-comment process, given that the SEC identified problems with the study). 
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conduct its own empirical study of the potential costs of the proposed rule 
was not arbitrary and capricious, given that the Commission based its 
conclusion as to the benefits of the new rules on “its own and its staff’s 
experience, the many comments received, and other evidence, in addition to 
the limited and conflicting empirical evidence.”36 
In American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC,37 the D.C. 
Circuit was again asked to determine whether the SEC had satisfactorily 
considered whether newly adopted Rule 151A would promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.38  The newly adopted rule disqualified 
fixed indexed annuities from falling within the definition of an annuity 
contract under Section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933.39  An indexed 
annuity credits its purchaser with a rate of return based on the performance of 
an identified securities index, such as the Standard and Poor’s Industrial 500 
Index.40  Pursuant to the newly minted Rule 151A, such annuities would no 
longer be exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act.41  
Invoking the earlier Chamber of Commerce reasoning, American Equity 
argued that the costs of implementing Rule 151A were too burdensome and 
that imposing the additional regulation would be inefficient.42  In response, 
the SEC justified the change by reasoning that Rule 151A would “bring 
about clarity in what [had] been an uncertain area of law.”43  The SEC thus 
believed reducing the uncertain status of indexed annuities was a benefit unto 
itself, further reasoning that the enhanced disclosures that would accompany 
the securities classification for this financial product would result in 
increased price transparency and market depth—each thereby favorably 
impacting efficiency, competition, and capital formation.44 
The D.C. Circuit faulted the SEC’s consideration of “competition.”45  
The court noted that while the SEC claimed to have analyzed Rule 151A’s 
potential effects on competition, the Commission disclosed no reasoned basis 
for its conclusion.46  The court rejected the SEC’s argument that the rule’s 
adoption would “bring about clarity in . . . an uncertain area of law” so that 
 
36. Id. at 142 (quoting Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,383). 
37. 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
38. Id. at 167. 
39. Id. at 167–68. 
40. Id. at 168. 
41. See id. at 167 (“As a result of this new rule, [fixed indexed annuities] are subject to the full 
panoply of requirements set forth by the Act . . . .”). 
42. Id. at 177. 
43. Id. (quoting Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, Securities Act 
Release No. 8996, Exchange Act Release No. 59,221, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138, 3171 (Jan. 16, 2009) 
(codified in part at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44. Id. 
45. See id. (“We hold that the Commission’s consideration of the effect of Rule 151A on . . . 
competition . . . was arbitrary and capricious.”). 
46. See id. (“The SEC purports to have analyzed the effect of the rule on competition, but does 
not disclose a reasoned basis for its conclusion that Rule 151A would increase competition.”). 
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competition would be enhanced by encouraging more parties to enter the 
marketplace for fixed indexed annuities.47  The court concluded that this 
reasoning was flawed, reasoning that the SEC could adopt any rule—whether 
this one or a completely different one—and that act would necessarily bring 
about clarity.48  The mere fact that a rule might bring about “clarity” was not, 
in itself, “helpful in assessing the effect Rule 151A [would have] on 
competition.”49  The court concluded that, at most, the SEC’s reasoning 
would support the proposition that any new SEC rule in this area “could 
promote competition” by bringing about clarity in an uncertain legal field; 
however, this was not sufficient to show what effect the specific rule at issue, 
Rule 151A, would have on competition.50 
The SEC further sought to justify new Rule 151A on the ground that it 
would increase competition because it “would require fuller public disclosure 
of [fixed indexed annuities] and thereby increase price transparency.”51  The 
D.C. Circuit rejected this rationale, finding the SEC’s competition analysis 
failed because the Commission “did not make any finding on the existing 
level of [price] competition in the marketplace under the state law regime” 
and thus “did not assess the baseline level of price transparency and 
information disclosure under state law.”52  As a result of this failure, “[t]he 
SEC could not accurately assess any potential increase or decrease in 
competition.”53  This basis for the D.C. Circuit’s opinion is very similar to 
the bases invoked in Chamber of Commerce regarding the SEC’s failure to 
consider state regulation as an alternative to the federal disclosure regime, as 
both disclosure and state regulation are “familiar tools” in the investor 
protection “tool kit.”54  With similar effect, the court concluded in American 
Equity that the SEC’s analysis of the rule’s impact on competition was 
“arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider the extent of the 
existing competition in its analysis.”55  The court, referencing its earlier 
holding in Chamber of Commerce, stated that by calling on the SEC to 
consider whether a rule would promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation, Congress imposed on “the SEC an obligation to consider the 
economic implications of certain rules it proposes.”56 
 
47. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
48. Id. at 177–78.  As the court observed, the Review Standard did not call for the SEC to 
consider “whether any rule would have an effect on competition,” but rather “whether the specific 




52. Id. (emphasis added). 
53. Id. 
54. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (characterizing 
disclosure as “a familiar tool in the Commission’s tool kit”). 
55. 613 F.3d at 178. 
56. Id. 
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With respect to Rule 151A’s impact on efficiency, the SEC’s 
justification fared no better than its other arguments.  In adopting Rule 151A, 
the SEC stated that increased price transparency would promote efficiency, 
arguing that the heightened disclosures flowing from registration as a 
consequence of Rule 151A would enable investors to make better-informed 
decisions in the investment-products marketplace.57  The court concluded 
that this analysis was insufficient because the SEC failed to consider 
whether, under existing regulations (principally those mandated by state 
law), investors were already able to make well-informed decisions.58  In 
other words, the SEC’s reasoning was arbitrary and capricious because it 
failed “to analyze the efficiency of the existing state law regime.”59 
Finally, the court concluded that the SEC’s “capital formation” 
reasoning was arbitrary and capricious because the Commission’s analysis of 
this factor depended heavily on its (allegedly) flawed assumption that Rule 
151A’s increased investor protections would increase market efficiency.60 
II. Congress and the Review Standard 
For most of its life, the principal governors on the SEC’s rulemaking 
authority were the requirement that its rules be “necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest,” and the need to consider whether the rule would advance 
the goal of “protection of investors.”61  In 1996, Congress enacted the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) and added 
the requirement that the SEC “also consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”62  In introducing the Review Standard, Congress left 
undefined the terms “consider,” “efficiency,” “competition,” and “capital 
formation,” and, far more importantly, did not explain what level of 
 
57. Id. at 178–79. 
58. Id. at 179. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Although this combination of requirements was formally applied by statute to the SEC’s 
general rulemaking authority in 1996, the provisions were applied to many of the SEC’s rulemaking 
powers since the early years of the Commission.  Compare National Securities Market 
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(b), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006)) (applying this combination of requirements to the SEC’s general 
rulemaking authority), with 15 U.S.C. § 79e(a) (Supp. IV 1938) (permitting the SEC, subject to 
those two restrictions, to utilize rules and regulations concerning the form of applications for 
registering as a holding company), and 15 U.S.C. § 79j(a) (Supp. I 1935) (permitting the SEC, 
subject to those two restrictions, to utilize rules and regulations regarding the form of applications 
for acquiring securities or capital assets). 
62. National Securities Markets Improvement Act § 106.  Oddly, NSMIA added the Review 
Standard only to the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006), the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006), and the Investment Company Act of 1940 
§ 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2006).  In 1999, Congress added similar language to the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c)(2006).  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 
106-102, § 224, 113 Stat. 1338, 1402 (1999). 
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consideration the SEC was required to give these items when engaged in 
rulemaking.63  Most of the focus of the legislative history was directed to the 
central substantive changes NSMIA introduced—namely, preempting much 
of the states’ role in the registration of public offerings of securities.64  
Nonetheless, insights into the breadth of the new requirement arise from the 
somewhat tortured path that the Review Standard traveled through the 
legislative process. 
We believe the strongest indication of the level of assessment mandated 
by the Review Standard is what was initially adopted by the Senate but 
abandoned in conference with the House.  The Senate’s competing bill, 
Senate Bill 1815, required the SEC’s Chief Economist to prepare a report on 
the potential consequences of a proposed regulation.65  The report would 
provide “an analysis of the likely effects of the proposed regulation on the 
economy of the United States, and particularly upon the securities markets 
and the participants in those markets.”66  The report was to contain “the 
estimated impact of the proposed regulation upon economic and market 
behavior, including any impact on market liquidity, the costs of investment, 
and the financial risks of investment.”67  In the hearings on the bill, this 
provision enjoyed a cool reception.  SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt believed 
the then-existing notice and comment procedure itself, without more, 
provided sufficient means to assess the burdens of any regulatory action; 
moreover, he argued against any assessment being made on a rule-by-rule 
basis, believing that the efforts of economists were “better directed toward 
analyzing the larger economic context and thematic issues that cut across 
markets” so that a market-by-market approach would be more useful.68  The 
only other testimony concerning the Senate’s version cautioned that any 
review standard would be opposed if it placed undue burdens on the SEC.69  
Nonetheless, the Senate bill retained this version of the review standard; 
indeed, the report accompanying the Senate’s passage of the bill described its 
review standard as calling on the SEC to “demonstrate serious economic 
analysis throughout the process of developing regulations.”70  At the same 
 
63. National Securities Markets Improvement Act § 106. 
64. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. E1928–29 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1996) (speech of Rep. Thomas J. 
Bliley, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on Commerce) (discussing NSMIA’s preemption of state 
authority over securities offerings and claiming disparate state laws hindered competition); H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-864, at 39–40 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920, 3920–21 
(discussing NSMIA’s preemption of state authority concerning regulating securities offerings). 
65. Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996, S. 1815, 104th Cong. § 310(b)(1) (1996). 
66. Id. § 310(b)(2)(A). 
67. Id. § 310(b)(2)(B). 
68. The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996: Hearing on S. 1815 Before S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 47 (1996) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 
69. Id. at 147 (statement of Paul Saltzman, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Public 
Securities Association). 
70. S. REP. NO. 104-293, at 16 (1996). 
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time, the overall thrust of the bill was, according to the report, that of 
achieving better balance between investor protection and the cost of 
investing through the preemption of much of the state regulation of public 
offerings.71 
The Senate’s review language disappeared in the conference convened 
to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate bills;72 the original 
language of the House bill carried the day and became law as part of 
NSMIA.73  The conferees apparently preferred the House’s loosely worded, 
indefinite language to the more precise, quantitatively driven approach 
approved by the Senate.  Most importantly, in rejecting the Senate’s 
approach, the conferees also rejected a cost–benefit assessment for each 
proposed SEC rule.  At the same time, it is not clear from the rest of the scant 
legislative history just how the SEC’s rulemaking practices were to be 
changed by the NSMIA, if at all, from what the practices were before. 
The Report accompanying the House’s version of NSMIA sheds modest 
light on the content of the Review Standard.  First, it expresses an 
expectation that “[t]he Committee expects that the Commission will engage 
in rigorous analysis pursuant to this section.”74  Second, it announces that 
when considering efficiency, competition, and capital formation, “the 
Commission shall analyze the potential costs and benefits of any rulemaking 
initiative, including, whenever practicable, specific analysis of such costs and 
benefits.”75 
While this language suggests more, indeed much more, would be 
required of the SEC in rulemaking than was the prior practice, a 
contemporary neutral assessment of the provision by the Congressional 
Budget Office concluded that “[b]ecause the SEC currently conducts cost–
benefit analyses in conjunction with its rulemakings,”76 the “CBO would not 
expect this provision to result in any additional costs to the federal 
government.”77 
Moreover, the House Report states that “[t]he legislation also seeks to 
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation in the capital markets 
without compromising investor protection by . . . requiring the consideration 
of efficiency, competition, and capital formation whenever the Securities and 
Exchange Commission . . . makes a public interest determination in its 
 
71. See id. at 2 (summarizing the report to follow). 
72. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 27 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) with Securities Investment 
Promotion Act of 1996, S. 1815, 104th Cong. § 310(b) (1996). 
73. Compare Securities Amendments of 1996, H.R. 3005, 104th Cong. (as passed by House, 
June 19, 1996) with H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 10 and National Securities Market Improvement Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 
78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2006)). 
74. H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 39 (1996) (emphasis added). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 24. 
77. Id. 
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rulemaking.”78  The report further adds that the triple considerations of 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation were to be “consistent with the 
public interest and investor protection.”79 
Thus while inviting “rigorous analysis” by the SEC per the Review 
Standard, the House Report also stated that for the life of the SEC, “the 
foremost mission of the Commission has been investor protection, and this 
section does not alter the Commission’s mission.”80 
Further, there is significant circumstantial evidence suggesting that 
Congress must not have intended the Review Standard to be especially 
demanding on the SEC.  Looking just at the language of the statute, the 
operative verb in the Review Standard is “consider”: the Review Standard 
does not require the SEC to “determine” whether a rule will actually promote 
efficiency, competition, or capital formation.  In fact, Congress included a 
“determination” requirement in the first draft of the provision, then removed 
it in subsequent versions.81 
The contemporary meaning of “consider” suggests that if, after 
“considering” whether a proposed rule would “promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation,” the SEC concludes that it would not 
promote those goals, the Review Standard does not require the SEC to 
abandon the rule.  Indeed, the plain import of the Review Standard is that it 
does not require the SEC to come to a conclusion about a proposed rule’s 
effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation; it does not prevent 
adoption of a rule because of indeterminacy of the rule’s impact.  For that 
matter, the plain language of the Review Standard does not require the SEC 
to state a strong reason why a rule should be passed even if, upon 
consideration, it appears the rule would not promote efficiency, competition, 
or capital formation. 
Nowhere in the legislative history did any member of Congress ever 
specify, or even suggest, exactly how the SEC should go about “considering” 
the enumerated factors, nor did any member ever specify exactly what aspect 
of “efficiency,” “competition,” or “capital formation” the SEC should 
consider.  (For example, does “efficiency” mean “efficiency of the capital 
markets”?  How is that distinct from “competition”?  What if a proposed rule 
might promote “efficiency,” but not promote “capital formation”?  The 
legislative history leaves these questions unanswered.)  What is stated in the 
legislative history is that the SEC’s “consideration” is to entail rigorous 
analysis and evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of the proposed 
rule.82  This is not the same as mandating that the rule must be justified 
 
78. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
79. Id. at 38. 
80. Id. at 39 (emphasis added). 
81. See H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. § 8(b) (1995) (requiring the SEC to consider or determine 
whether an action will “promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”). 
82. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
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because it meets each of the considerations of efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation, or requiring that the rule, in the language of Business 
Roundtable, yield a net benefit.83 
Further evidence that Congress did not intend the Review Standard to 
impose significant changes in the criteria by which to judge SEC rulemaking 
occurred in 1999 when Congress added the Review Standard to the 
Investment Advisers Act.84  Interestingly, this apparent oversight was 
corrected through a conforming amendment to the much more significant 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,85 which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, the 
cornerstone of financial regulation since the Great Depression.86  Thus, the 
primary thrust of the legislative effort was to overhaul regulation of the 
financial services industry and not to update SEC rulemaking procedures.87  
In the conference report accompanying the bill, the conferees rebuked the 
SEC for not doing a satisfactory job in implementing the Review Standard 
earlier enacted in the NSMIA.88  However, the conferees gave no specific 
examples of the failures causing their unhappiness;89 hence, their rebuke 
appears hollow, as Congress later added the same Review Standard the 
conferees were complaining about to the Investment Advisers Act.  Despite 
many hearing appearances by SEC Chairman Levitt and staff members in 
connection with the 1999 legislation,90 the hearings and other portions of the 
legislative history of the 1999 legislation are devoid of any reports on the 
SEC’s discharge or noncompliance with the Review Standard.  In the end, 
the same Review Standard as earlier enacted in NSMIA was included in the 
Investment Advisers Act. 
As seen from the above, the legislative history of the Review Standard 
is far from conclusive or clear on the intensity of the review mandated by the 
NSMIA.  On the one hand, there is evidence from the House Commerce 
Committee’s report stating the Committee’s expectation that the SEC would 
engage in “rigorous analysis,” and that the SEC would quantify and analyze 
with specificity the costs and benefits of a proposed rule.91  Further, when the 
 
83. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
84. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-12, § 224, 113 Stat. 1338, 1402 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (2006)) (incorporating the Review Standard into § 202 of the Investment 
Advisers Act). 
85. Id. 
86. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
18 (4th ed. 2009) (calling the Glass-Steagall Act a “centerpiece of American banking policy” 
between its enactment in 1933 and its later repeal). 
87. See KENNETH R. BENSON ET AL., FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION: GRAHAM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999, LAW AND EXPLANATION 3, 21 (1999) (summarizing the main 
purposes of the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, none of which include updating SEC rulemaking 
procedures). 
88. H.R. REP. NO. 106-434, at 165 (1999) (Conf. Rep.). 
89. See id. at 164–65. 
90. H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 3, at 120 (1999). 
91. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
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House was considering adopting the Conference Report, House Commerce 
Committee Chairman Bliley stated (erroneously) that the provision would 
“require the SEC to conduct meaningful cost–benefit analysis of proposed” 
rules.92  In the Conference Report for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the 
conferees claimed disappointment with SEC compliance with the new 
provisions.93  And, many witnesses in the House subcommittee hearings on 
the NSMIA’s precursor testified to their belief that more serious SEC 
consideration should be statutorily required in the rulemaking context.94 
Perhaps most enlightening is Congress’s failure to act even when it 
claimed dissatisfaction with how the SEC implemented the NSMIA.  When it 
added the “promote efficiency” consideration requirements to the Investment 
Advisers Act, Congress had an opportunity to hold hearings in which it could 
criticize the SEC’s implementation of the NSMIA.  It did not do so.  
Congress also had the opportunity to modify the language added to the 
Investment Advisers Act and to modify the language in the other statutes.  
Instead, it chose to use the same language once again.95 
Further insight into the level of assessment Congress imposed on the 
SEC through the Review Standard is suggested by Congress’s enactment of 
an amendment, also as part of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, that set forth a 
very different review standard for rules promulgated by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).96  That standard called on the CFTC 
to “consider the costs and benefits of the action” and provided that “[t]he 
costs and benefits . . . shall be evaluated in light of . . . considerations of the 
efficiency, competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets.”97 
The very different language used for the CFTC—namely, the express 
call for the CFTC to “consider the costs and benefits” of rules, as well as the 
clear implication of Congress’s embracement of a more demanding standard 
for the CFTC than for the SEC—further supports the view that Congress, 
when it wished for costs and benefits to be assessed, certainly knew how to 
impose that requirement for an agency’s rulemaking.  Moreover, the fact that 
 
92. 142 CONG. REC. 25,810 (1996) (statement of Rep. Thomas Bliley). 
93. H.R. REP. NO. 106-434, at 165. 
94. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (describing the witness testimony before the 
subcommittee as indicating a need for modernization of the SEC’s regulatory scheme to avoid 
inefficient, costly, and duplicitous rules that fail to adequately protect investors). 
95. Compare Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, § 224, 113 Stat. 1338, 1402 (1999) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (2006)) with National Securities Market Improvement Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) 
(2006)). 
96. S. 257, 105th Cong. § 11 (as introduced on Feb. 4, 1997). 
97. H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. § 119 (2000) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2006)) (enacted by 
incorporation by reference in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
§ 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763 (2000)).  The only reference in the legislative history to this change 
states generally that the standard calls on the CFTC to consider costs and benefits of its actions and 
that the standard does not apply to investigative or emergency actions.  H.R. REP. NO. 106-711, 
pt. 1, at 40 (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 106-711, pt. 3, at 59 (2000); S. REP. NO. 106-390, at 13 (2000). 
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Congress imposed the more demanding language on the CFTC at the same 
time that it extended the earlier NSMIA standard to the Investment Advisers 
Act suggests not only a consciousness that the two agencies operated under 
different standards, but also that Congress knew how to express a more 
demanding standard when it wanted to do so and therefore suggests that 
Congress consciously chose to impose two very different standards on the 
agencies.  As seen earlier, the NSMIA conferees rejected and eliminated the 
requirement, found in Senate Bill 1815, that the SEC Chief Economist 
prepare a report on the economic consequences of a proposed rule—
including its effect on the market and market participants—and publish that 
report before adopting the rule.98  Had the Congress that enacted Gramm-
Leach-Bliley truly wanted the SEC to do more in compliance with the 
Review Standard, it could have amended the Review Standard’s 
requirements to be on more of a scale of Senate Bill 1815; it did not.  And, 
despite House Report 104-622 and Representative Bliley’s statements to the 
contrary, the Review Standard (that is, the language Congress actually 
adopted) does not explicitly require the SEC to specify the costs of any 
proposed rule, to engage in rigorous analysis, or even to engage in cost–
benefit analysis. 
Given this conflict in the legislative history, and given that the purpose 
of the enacting legislation was primarily to modify the allocation of 
responsibilities between federal and state regulatory entities (or, in the case 
of the provisions added to the Investment Advisers Act, to repeal Glass-
Steagall), it seems unlikely that the Review Standard was truly designed to 
establish more than a thoughtful analysis of the proposed rule’s potential 
effects.  Certainly, it was not designed to require the SEC to conclude, as 
Business Roundtable states, that the rule yields a “net benefit.”99 
III. Outside the Shadow of Precedent 
A. The Supreme Court’s Tapestry for Judicial Review 
The leading authority for judicial review of agency action is Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,100 which embraces a two-step analysis.101  Step one 
asks whether the agency had the authority to act, and step two considers 
whether the agency permissibly exercised the authority Congress granted 
it.102  It is under this latter step that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
enters the scene.  Under the APA, a court can invalidate an agency-made rule 
 
98. See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text. 
99. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
100. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
101. See id. at 843 (describing the two steps required by the newly minted analysis). 
102. See id. at 842–43 (“Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”). 
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if it concludes the rule is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”103  “Hard look” review has become 
the name of the game: courts subject an agency’s rule to rather rigorous 
analysis to ensure the rule is the product of reasoned decisionmaking—that 
the rule is a product of sound reason rather than being “arbitrary and 
capricious.”104  The Supreme Court famously generalized this test in Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co.105: 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.106 
Thus, the quality and coherence of the agency’s reasoning is the focus 
of judicial review under hard look.  And this makes sense; as noted by one 
commentator on administrative law, the hard look requirement helps courts 
ensure that an agency is not exceeding its mandate or the bounds of its 
statutory authority with a particular rule.107 
While the agency’s reasoning is fair game under hard look review, the 
specific procedures that the agency uses to arrive at its final rule are not.  In 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC108 the Court struck down the 
D.C. Circuit’s attempt to require an agency to satisfy extra-statutory 
procedural requirements before enacting a new rule.109  The Court tempered 
its ruling by stating, “[t]his is not to say necessarily that there are no 
circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency action 
because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by the 
statute,” but the Court ultimately concluded, “such circumstances, if they 
exist, are extremely rare.”110  First enunciated in the context of agency 
adjudication, the rule from Vermont Yankee had a dramatic effect on judicial 
review of agency rulemaking, stopping courts from imposing extra-statutory 
 
103. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
104. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 599–600 (5th ed. 
2010) (arguing that State Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking requirement forces agencies to discuss 
all major considerations it took into account in formulating a new, major rule to demonstrate that its 
rule meets the reasoned decisionmaking requirement). 
105. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
106. Id. at 43. 
107. PIERCE, supra note 104, § 7.4, at 599. 
108. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
109. Id. at 525. 
110. Id. at 524; see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990) 
(reaffirming this principle in the context of informal agency adjudications). 
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procedural requirements on agencies.111  Thus, when reviewing an agency-
made rule, courts must confine themselves to the requirements that actually 
appear in the agency’s organic statute (and any other relevant statutes) and 
not attempt to add any extra-statutory procedures to satisfy their own sense 
of what the agency should, or should not, be doing.112 
B. “Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall” 
In its decisions applying the Review Standard, the precedent most 
heavily relied upon by the D.C. Circuit was not that of the Supreme Court 
but the D.C. Circuit’s own earlier decisions.  Business Roundtable and 
American Equity both cite almost exclusively to Chamber of Commerce (at 
least with regard to how to interpret the Review Standard), and Chamber of 
Commerce in turn relied on the D.C. Circuit’s own decision in Public Citizen 
v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.113  There, the court reviewed 
a regulation that limited the number of hours commercial drivers could 
work.114  The court held that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious—but 
for reasons we find to be completely inapposite here.  There, as here, the 
basis of the decision was that the agency had failed to satisfy the 
requirements of its organic statute.115  However, the review standard at issue 
in Public Citizen is completely unlike the Review Standard applicable to the 
SEC; that statute actually requires the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) to “ensure” that the rule will have the effect of 
promoting a specific factor.116  The Public Citizen court vacated the rule at 
issue because not only had the agency failed to ensure that the rule would 
promote that factor—it hadn’t even discussed it in its adopting release.117  
Thus, “[b]ecause the agency . . . wholly failed to comply with this specific 
statutory requirement,” the court vacated the agency’s rule.118  The court 
 
111. PIERCE, supra note 104, § 7.8, at 661. 
112. See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543 (“Absent constitutional constraints or extremely 
compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of 
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their 
multitudinous duties.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
113. 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
114. Id. at 1214–16. 
115. Id. at 1216. 
116. See id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(4) (2006)).  The agency’s organic statute, the Motor 
Carrier Safety Act, stated that “[a]t a minimum, the regulations [promulgated by the agency] shall 
ensure that . . . the operation of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the 
physical condition of the operators.”  49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
117. See Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1217 (requiring the agency to explain its justification for the 
new rule and vacating the judgment due to the agency’s failure to consider or discuss the required 
statutory factor when it issued its new rule). 
118. Id. at 1216. 
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needed no further basis on which to invalidate the rule, so it provided no 
further holdings on the matter.119 
We emphasize that the actual holding of Public Citizen has nothing to 
do with cost–benefit analysis—it was that the agency had failed to live up to 
the standards in its own statute that it ensure a certain outcome from its 
rule.120  But the court did opine—albeit in dicta—on the possible infirmities 
of the agency’s cost–benefit analysis.  Of particular note is that the statute in 
Public Citizen explicitly required the agency to “consider the costs and 
benefits” of a proposed rule.121  Thus, the Public Citizen court stood on firm 
ground when it opined that the agency had fallen short of its statutory duties.  
(The agency there concluded that cost estimates “vary enormously” and thus 
refrained from trying to quantify them; it didn’t even bother to give an 
excuse for its failure to estimate the rule’s potential benefits.)122  In other 
words, the actual holding of Public Citizen had nothing to do with the 
agency’s alleged failure to consider costs, much less with its failure to 
consider that (or any other) factor. 
Yet, despite the difference, Chamber of Commerce used Public Citizen 
as the lens through which it assessed the SEC’s satisfaction of the Review 
Standard.  The court cites Public Citizen fourteen times in its opinion.  For 
example, Chamber of Commerce invoked Public Citizen for the proposition 
that, even if an agency faces uncertainty over the costs of a proposed rule, the 
agency has a “statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic 
implications of the rule it has proposed”123 and it must “exercise its expertise 
to make tough choices about which of the competing estimates is most 
plausible, and to hazard a guess as to which is correct, even if . . . the 
estimate will be imprecise.”124  But in doing so the court failed to note that 
the review standard at issue in Public Citizen called on the regulatory agency 
“[at] a minimum . . . [to] ensure that . . . the operation of commercial motor 
vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the 
operators.”125  Moreover, the statute under which the FMCSA had acted 
 
119. See id. (“Several of petitioners’ other objections also raise troubling concerns about the 
[agency’s] decisionmaking process.  We do not, however, enter final judgment on those, as we are 
vacating and remanding the matter in any case . . . .”). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1221 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31506(d) (2006)).  For other examples of Congress 
directing those charged with implementing the statute to consider the costs and benefits to any new 
regulations or requirements, see also 49 U.S.C. § 31136(c)(2)(A) (2006) and 49 U.S.C. § 31502(d) 
(2006). 
122. Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1221–22. 
123. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Pub. Citizen, 
374 F.3d at 1221). 
124. Id. (quoting Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1221) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
language from Public Citizen, quoted by the Chamber of Commerce court, was itself dicta.  The 
Public Citizen court declined to “enter [a] final judgment on” the failure to quantify and consider 
costs of a proposed rule, but stated it was including the discussion of this point merely “for a sense 
of completeness.”  Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1216–17. 
125. Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1212 (emphasis added). 
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expressly required that the “Secretary shall consider the costs and benefits of 
the requirement.”126  Thus, not only was formal cost–benefit analysis 
expressly called for by Congress, but the Secretary was under the further 
mandate to “ensure” that the proposed rule did not have a deleterious effect.  
Each of these components of the review standard was at the heart of Public 
Citizen, but light-years from the Review Standard applicable to the SEC.  As 
seen, the SEC is not called upon under its Review Standard to either engage 
in cost–benefit analysis or to ensure that competition, efficiency, or capital 
formation are favorably impacted as a result of the rule.  In sum, Chamber of 
Commerce rested its analysis and conclusions on the dicta arising from a case 
where the regulatory agency was operating under a markedly different 
review standard.  One can speculate, therefore, whether the mixing of apples 
and oranges yields only a lemon. 
Business Roundtable made limited reference to Public Citizen; 
nonetheless, it relied almost exclusively on Chamber of Commerce, 
particularly those passages of Chamber of Commerce that rested on Public 
Citizen.  While courts can be expected to rely on their own precedents, such 
reliance is mischievous when the precedents are inapposite, as was Public 
Citizen to the issues before the court in Chamber of Commerce and Business 
Roundtable. 
C. Defying the Supreme Court—Usurping Congress 
A close analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Chamber of 
Commerce and Business Roundtable reflects stunning disconnects.  As seen 
in Part II, while the D.C. Circuit’s opinions repeatedly call for cost–benefit 
analysis, this is not the standard that Congress prescribed.  Indeed, neither 
case involved, as did American Equity, the question of what role efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation should play in the review process.  Most 
significantly, the D.C. Circuit engages in the ultimate disconnect—namely, 
being outside the precedent, reviewed above, developed by the Supreme 
Court for judicial review of actions by administrative agencies.  Through its 
single-minded focus on cost–benefit analysis, the ultimate effect of the 
Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable decisions appears to be 
nothing less than establishing a new review standard.  If this surmise is 
correct—and we believe it can hardly be otherwise—then each of these 
decisions violates the simple, clear holding of the Supreme Court that the 
“circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency action 
because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by the 
 
126. 49 U.S.C. § 31502(d) (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 31136(c)(2) (“Before 
prescribing regulations under this section, the Secretary shall consider, to the extent practicable[,] 
. . . costs and benefits . . . .”). 
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statute[,] . . . if they exist, are extremely rare.”127  As a leading commentator 
has observed, this principle, first established in Vermont Yankee, has had a 
dramatic effect on judicial review of agency rulemaking, stopping courts 
from imposing extra-statutory procedural requirements on agencies.128 
The incongruity of Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable 
with Vermont Yankee is even sharper when considered against American 
Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,129 where the Supreme Court 
observed that “Congress uses specific language when intending that an 
agency engage in cost–benefit analysis.”130  The Supreme Court then cited to 
numerous statutory examples where Congress had so expressed its intentions 
in clear and unambiguous language, using the phrase itself or mentioning 
“costs” in relation to some other stated objective, or simply using terms like 
“feasible.”131  Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the absence of such 
clear verbiage means that the reviewing court cannot compel the agency to 
engage in cost–benefit analysis.132 
American Equity133 stands on quite different footing than either 
Chamber of Commerce or Business Roundtable.  In American Equity, Chief 
Judge Sentelle—who also authored Public Citizen—confined the court’s 
analysis to a review of the section of the adopting release that actually dealt 
with “efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”134  Rather than 
focusing on costs and benefits, he emphasized the overall incompleteness of 
the rule’s supporting analysis.135  In this way, the analysis in American 
Equity differed greatly from that in Chamber of Commerce and Business 
Roundtable. 
 
127. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978); see also Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 644–46 (1990) (reaffirming this principle in the 
context of informal agency adjudications). 
128. PIERCE, supra note 104, § 7.8, at 661. 
129. 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
130. Id. at 510–11.  American Textile is a natural extension of Vermont Yankee, since if the 
reviewing court cannot impose a standard other than that adopted by Congress, the reviewing court 
cannot impose cost–benefit analysis where Congress has stated another review standard. 
131. Id. at 510–12, 510 n.30.  One such example the Court referenced was where the statute 
requires the agency to use “the best available and safest technologies . . . , except where the 
Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient to justify the incremental 
costs.”  Id. at 510 (emphasis omitted). 
132. Id. at 512; see Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1508 (2009) (stating 
that in American Textile the agency did not need to “engage in cost–benefit analysis,” in part 
because the statute did not contain such a requirement). 
133. American Equity was originally decided in 2009.  See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. 
SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (remanding and requiring the SEC to “either complete an 
analysis sufficient to satisfy its obligations under § 2(b) [of the Securities Act], or explain why that 
section does not govern this rulemaking”), amended and superseded, 613 F.3d 166, 179 (D.C. Cir. 
2010).  The opinion was reissued with amendments in 2010 to reflect the Court’s decision that 
vacating the SEC rule was the appropriate remedy.  Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 
166 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
134. Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 176–79. 
135. Id. at 177–79. 
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And arguably, the court did a better job of adhering to the hard-look 
standards from State Farm and (more generally) the APA by focusing on the 
quality of the reasoning that the SEC actually did when it promulgated 
Rule 151A.  In State Farm the Court held that an agency must provide a 
“satisfactory explanation for its action.”136  And in American Equity, the 
court focused on each of the SEC’s serial conclusions that Rule 151A would 
in fact favorably impact “efficiency,” “competition,” and “capital 
formation.”137  Because the SEC’s analysis in support of those conclusions 
fell so woefully short of being convincing, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
SEC’s adoption of the rule was arbitrary and capricious.  Simply stated, the 
SEC failed to provide a reasoned explanation for the rule it adopted, at least 
against readily available alternatives.  (Indeed, even if the SEC had not gone 
so far as to conclude that Rule 151A would favorably impact efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation, the incompleteness in the SEC’s 
reasoning seems to us to be so great that the result would not have changed.)  
We therefore believe the American Equity panel stood on firm ground, 
ground sowed by State Farm, because the court there assessed the quality of 
the reasoning the SEC employed in its efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation analysis. 
D. Has the SEC Repeatedly Shot Itself in the Foot? 
We might still question whether the American Equity court nonetheless 
overstepped the limits of judicial review by failing to judge the SEC’s 
performance per the terms of the Review Standard: after all, the court 
focused on whether the SEC had properly concluded that Rule 151A would 
actually promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation, rather than 
just asking whether the SEC has adequately considered the question.  As 
seen, the Review Standard asks only that the SEC consider whether the 
proposed rule will promote those factors.  It doesn’t require the SEC to 
ensure or otherwise conclude that the factors will be promoted.  Nor does it 
require the SEC to ensure (or even conclude) that the proposed rule will have 
the net effect of promoting those factors (rather than having the effect of 
promoting those factors in some way, but the net effect being one of not 
promoting them).  Nor does it specify the universe of data that it must 
consider—and this point differentiates the Review Standard from, say, other 
laws (like the one at issue in State Farm) that specifically require the agency 
 
136. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
137. See Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 177 (discussing how the SEC’s § 2(b) analysis regarding 
“competition” failed because the Commission “d[id] not disclose a reasoned basis for its conclusion 
that Rule 151A would increase competition” (emphasis added)); id. at 179 (“The SEC’s failure to 
analyze the efficiency of the existing state law regime renders arbitrary and capricious the SEC’s 
judgment that applying federal securities law would increase efficiency.” (emphasis added)). 
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to consider a particular set of data or research, and to take those into 
consideration when promulgating a rule.138 
In American Equity, the court simply circumnavigated these issues by 
focusing on what the SEC actually purported to do; the SEC’s adopting 
release reached conclusions regarding the favorable effects Rule 151A would 
have on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.139  We might well 
wonder what the result would have been had the SEC instead merely 
explored the possible effects, pro and con, on each of the review factors.  But 
the SEC instead affirmatively found that Rule 151A would enhance 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.  By doing this, it fell into 
State Farm’s talons.  In State Farm, the agency was under no express 
statutory obligation to weigh the rule’s potential costs and benefits.140  Yet, 
the agency did so anyway.141  The Supreme Court proceeded to assess the 
agency’s actions on the agency’s own terms.  Having found the cost–benefit 
analysis incomplete, the Court concluded the agency had acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in adopting the rule since it failed to provide a “reasoned 
analysis” for its action.142 
Similar to State Farm, the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Chamber of 
Commerce and Business Roundtable can be seen as instances where the 
agency justifies its rule by an approach not directly implicated by the Review 
Standard, namely reviewing the costs and benefits of the rule it adopts.  For 
example, in the rulemaking reviewed in Chamber of Commerce the SEC 
provided close analysis of the impact of the proposed changes in governance 
rules on efficiency, competition, and capital formation in Part VIII of the 
adopting release, and in Part VI of the release, it estimated the costs and 
benefits of the new rule.143  Most striking is that the SEC in adopting the new 
independence rules focused its attention on the reasoning advanced in the 
 
138. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 33, 43 (articulating the requirement under the National Traffic 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 that the Secretary of Transportation “consider ‘relevant 
available motor vehicle safety data’” and “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’” (citations omitted)). 
139. Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 176–79; Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance 
Contracts, Securities Act Release No. 8996, Exchange Act Release No. 59,221, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138, 
3169–72 (Jan. 16, 2009) (codified in part at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
140. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 33–34 (articulating the statutory requirement that the NHTSA 
“consider . . . whether the proposed standard ‘is reasonable, practicable and appropriate’” and “the 
‘extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes’ of the [National Traffic 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966]”).  In assessing the cost–benefit analysis engaged in by the 
NHTSA, the court remarked that “[t]he agency’s obligation is to articulate a ‘rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.’”  Id. at 59. 
141. Id. at 54–55. 
142. Id. at 57. 
143. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 46,378, 46,386–87, 46,388–89 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270); see Chamber of 
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that even if there is uncertainty as 
to the effects of a proposed rule on efficiency, competition, capital formation, or costs this does not 
excuse the SEC from its statutory obligation to consider the economic consequences of a proposed 
regulation). 
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latter and not the former.  While this might appear totally consistent with 
State Farm, we believe there is an important, albeit nuanced, difference.  
Chamber of Commerce does not, as did State Farm, merely hold the agency 
failed to provide a reasoned basis through the use of cost–benefit analysis—
but expressly held that the cost–benefit approach underlaid the Review 
Standard.144  Had Chamber of Commerce instead more narrowly limited its 
holding, the court’s approach would have been closer to the firm ground of 
State Farm.  However, the message remains: had the SEC eschewed 
proffering a conclusion premised on cost–benefit analysis, it would have 
(under available Supreme Court precedent) been in a much better place for 
limiting the scope of judicial review.  
There is yet another force lurking in the background.  Cost–benefit 
analysis of agency actions is regularly undertaken by the Office of 
Management and Budget through its Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA).145  However, independent regulatory agencies, such as the 
SEC, have not been subject to OIRA reviews, reflecting the constitutional 
uncertainty surrounding whether the executive branch can interdict activities 
carried out by an agency pursuant to congressionally enacted standards and 
mandates.146 
It is intriguing to speculate whether the SEC’s rules would meet with 
more success if subject to OIRA review rather than the newly established 
activism of the D.C. Circuit.147  Equally ponderous is whether the D.C. 
 
144. See Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144 (holding that the SEC violated the APA when 
it failed to consider the costs of two conditions in its proposed regulations). 
145. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the product of the Paper 
Reduction Act of 1980.  About OIRA, WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_administrator.  President Reagan soon mobilized the 
office to undertake cost–benefit analysis of non-independent regulatory agencies through Executive 
Order 12,291.  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981); see Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential 
Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 478 & n.171 (1987) 
(discussing presidential efforts to increase agency accountability through the use of executive 
orders). 
146. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal 
Regulation?  Deeper and Wider Cost–Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1506 (2002) 
(stating that President Reagan considered, but declined, subjecting independent agencies to these 
reviews). 
147. OIRA and review by a federal appellate court, however, are not mirror images of one 
another.  While the appellate court can be expected to have a point of view, it is less likely to be 
swayed by external influence than OIRA.  Indeed, there is a good deal of information surrounding 
the conduct and outcomes of OIRA review that calls into question the detachment with which costs 
and benefits were assessed.  There is every reason to fear that the independence of the review 
process within the executive branch of government is not likely to be as insulated from external 
influence as occurs in the more transparent adversarial setting of judicial review.  See Nicholas 
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1260, 1305–07 (2006) (applying public choice theory and arguing that the OIRA would be 
vulnerable to lobbying by interest groups).  Moreover, OIRA reviews are not themselves subject to 
judicial review.  Id. at 1309.  For criticism of the OIRA process, see generally Alan B. Morrison, 
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1059 (1986). 
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Circuit would be less demanding in its own review of SEC rulemaking if 
aware that each SEC action could be, and might have been, reviewed by 
OIRA.  In any case, rigorous review of SEC rules by the D.C. Circuit might 
be seen as placing SEC rulemaking on the same footing as non-independent 
regulatory agency rulemaking.  In this sense, the recent arousal of the D.C. 
Circuit moves the SEC toward a level of accountability applied to many 
other agencies of the federal government.  But, the D.C. Circuit’s activism 
also poses a serious separation of powers issue to the extent it imposes a 
standard for review contrary to the one adopted by Congress.  Nonetheless, 
the SEC’s repeated efforts in setting forth costs and benefits as a separate 
portion of its analysis to support adoption of rules can be seen as being in 
step with OIRA reviews and, hence, defensive to any movement to subject 
the agency to OIRA. 
IV. Moving Forward in the Reshaped Regulatory Landscape 
Nearly half a century ago, Richard Stewart crisply summarized the 
dilemma posed by judicial review of agency rulemaking to determine 
whether adequate consideration was given to multiple objectives Congress 
has set forth for the agency to consider: 
[I]t is unlikely that principles or guidelines can be developed for 
weighing particular interests, [so that] agencies attempting to solve 
complex problems will be largely unable to anticipate what a 
subsequent reviewing court may demand of them.  Even on remand, 
there is no assurance that the agency’s best efforts to redistribute 
weights among the various interests will satisfy the reviewing court.  
The resulting oscillation between agency and court may entail 
enormous delays and impose substantial costs on the litigants, the 
agency, and the society generally.  Since agencies and public interest 
representatives command only limited resources, such costs may 
seriously impair the effort to stimulate more effective agency action 
on behalf of unorganized interests.  On the other hand, if courts sought 
to avoid such costs by declining to remand agency decisions for 
further proceedings, they would be abandoning the only effective 
sanction behind the adequate consideration requirement.148 
There can be little doubt that the D.C. Circuit has overstepped the 
permissible level of review Congress intended for SEC rulemaking.  The 
complaint is not, however, novel.  Administrative law scholars, judges, and 
regulators have long written on the appropriate balance to be struck when 
judges are reviewing agency actions.149  In broad overview, the question is 
 
148. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1784 (1975) (footnotes omitted). 
149. See, e.g., Frank E. Cooper, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 3 U. DET. L.J. 53, 
54–55 (1940) (introducing the article’s topic of balancing administrative authority and judicial 
review of administrative decisions); Cuthbert W. Pound, Constitutional Aspects of American 
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not just that of relative competencies, pitting the technocratic staff of the 
agency against the generalist courts, but also involves issues of mediating 
interest politics that can impact the course of regulation.  On this point, the 
ideal of an independent judiciary can be trumpeted as necessary to address 
the narrower group self-interest that might underlay a regulatory initiative. 
Confounding these historical tensions in the case of the SEC are the 
multiple factors set forth in the Review Standard.  As seen earlier, when 
Congress inserted the additional considerations of “efficiency, competition 
and capital formation,” the Committee Report was clear in saying that these 
considerations were not to override the long-established criteria of investor 
protection.150  And, Congress assigned no weight to be given to any of the 
newly added factors.  Moreover, assessing the probable impact of any rule is 
always problematic, and more so to assess the imponderable benefits and 
burdens of a rule on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
One approach to this conundrum would be for the reviewing court to 
accord the regulatory agency deference on such indefinite, speculative, and 
arcane considerations, since judicial review on such a matter is beyond the 
court’s core competency.  This was the quiet life the SEC led prior to 
Chamber of Commerce.151  Another approach, reflected in the D.C. Circuit’s 
interpretation, is to read into Congress’s Review Standard the D.C. Circuit’s 
own limitation.152  When this course has been taken, it has seriously eroded 
the discretion of the administrative agency.153  Because so much of what the 
SEC deals with is rulemaking that, on the one hand, produces benefits to 
investors, markets, market participants, and the economy as a whole that are 
speculative and non-quantifiable—and, on the other hand, entails costs that 
are easily quantifiable—it has invited a judicially contrived mandate for the 
SEC to rigorously set forth the case that the perceived benefits exceed the 
estimated costs.  If that is what is required, then the D.C. Circuit has 
eviscerated the agency, at least in areas where challenges to its rules would 
be expected.  But is this the course that the D.C. Circuit has begun, or is there 
room within its own approach to recalibrate and reach a result more 
consistent with Congress’s intent and the role of an independent regulatory 
agency such as the SEC? 
 
Administrative Law, 9 A.B.A. J. 409, 413 (1923) (questioning the extent to which administrative 
decisions should be exempt from judicial review); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in 
Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 
221 (1996) (providing a D.C. Circuit judge’s opinion on how current doctrines of judicial review 
work in practice). 
150. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
152. See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1508 
(1983) (suggesting courts can deal with uncertainty by reading statutes as placing the burden of 
proof on agencies, and resolving unclear situations in favor of industry). 
153. See, e.g., id. (describing a case where the court read into a statute a requirement that the 
agency establish significant risk for low-level benzene exposure before setting a maximum exposure 
level as stripping the agency of its discretion). 
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In a contemporary legal and political climate that is defined by a rising 
skepticism of government and more particularly of regulation,154 the SEC 
(and for that matter all independent regulatory agencies) must accept that it 
cannot support its rulemaking only through generalized, undeveloped 
assertions of a proposed rule’s impact on competition, efficiency, and capital 
formation.  Such a bald assertion is not likely to survive attack in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  More is always better than less, and even more so when it 
comes to justifying burdensome regulations in today’s legal and political 
climate.155  Furthermore, the legislative history of the NSMIA, reviewed 
earlier, reflects that Congress unquestionably did expect thoughtful 
consideration of competition, efficiency, and capital formation whenever the 
SEC engages in rulemaking.156  Drive-by justifications that are dismissive of 
the burdens of the regulation, while once the norm for SEC rulemaking, are 
no longer acceptable.  Hence, our analysis of the legislative history supports 
the result reached by the D.C. Circuit in American Equity, but not in 
Chamber of Commerce or Business Roundtable. 
What remains in doubt is the degree of deference to be accorded the 
SEC.  Here we should distinguish the issues posed in Chamber of Commerce 
and American Equity from those in Business Roundtable.  In Chamber of 
Commerce and American Equity, the SEC launched new regulatory 
approaches—requiring, respectively, greater board independence and 
classifying a financial product as a security157—without developing a 
sufficiently detailed record for either regulatory initiative.  The justifications 
set forth were not supported empirically, but rhetorically.  The agency 
appears to have been content to draw largely on its asserted expertise that 
these initiatives would improve investor protection and the proposed rule 
would favorably impact efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
 
154. See Larry Margasak, House Republicans Stepping Up Anti-Regulation Effort, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/02/house-gop-anti-
regulation-bills_n_1125242.html (describing anti-regulation bills proposed by House Republicans 
in December 2011); Frank Newport, Americans Leery of Too Much Gov’t Regulation of Business, 
GALLUP (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125468/Americans-Leery-Govt-Regulation-
Business.aspx (finding 57% of Americans are worried about too much regulation of business); 
Lydia Saad, At 13%, Congress’ Approval Ties All-Time Low, GALLUP (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/150038/Congress-Approval-Ties-Time-Low.aspx (finding low approval 
of Congress across political affiliation). 
155. A reflection of the anti-regulatory bias toward securities regulatory issues is Congress’ 
recently enacted Jumpstarting Our Business Startups Act, which includes, among numerous 
provisions removing regulation for so-called “emerging growth companies” and other startups, a 
call on the SEC to review the disclosure regulations for registering securities so as to “modernize 
and simplify the registration process and reduce the costs and other burdens” associated with 
regulation.  See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 108, 126 Stat. 306, 
313 (2012).  This is the only reference, however, in the legislation to any assessments of regulatory 
costs and burdens. 
156. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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Unlike the initiatives in Chamber of Commerce and American Equity, 
the initiative challenged in Business Roundtable—proxy access—was a 
response to legislation that clearly provided that the SEC’s rules “may 
include a requirement” giving shareholders the means to nominate 
directors.158  By enacting that authority on that precise issue, not under some 
broadly written enabling statute, Congress took the big policy issue, proxy 
access, off the table.  So viewed, it is anomalous that the entire analysis in 
Business Roundtable is devoted to the SEC’s failings in justifying any 
shareholder access to the nominating process. 
For example, the D.C. Circuit chastised the SEC’s failure to set forth the 
costs corporations may incur in opposing nominees, the SEC’s failure to 
address the probable benefits shareholder access might have on company 
performance, and the SEC’s failure to consider whether special interest 
groups, most notably labor unions, would use proxy access as leverage to 
advance interests unrelated to increasing shareholder value.159  These are 
each legitimate concerns.  But they are concerns that go to the core issue—
shareholder authority to nominate directors.  Nowhere in Business 
Roundtable does the D.C. Circuit take note that it was Congress that 
addressed and answered the question of the appropriateness of shareholder 
access as a means for the SEC to advance its mandate. 
Stunningly, Business Roundtable makes no reference whatsoever to the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s express authorization for a rule providing proxy access or 
note that the SEC acted pursuant to that authority.160  The grant of authority 
to the SEC was not only unqualified, but clearly anticipated that the SEC 
would adopt a rule that provided terms and conditions for what the agency 
believed was appropriate proxy access.161  Congress expressly authorized the 
SEC to provide a mechanism for shareholder access and thereby embraced 
the benefits of shareholder access.  The legislative history is clear that proxy 
access was to be provided and that Congress was deferring to the SEC to 
address the conditions under which such access would be available.162  The 
 
158. See supra notes 2, 6–10 and accompanying text. 
159. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150–52 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
160. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010). 
161. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 146–47 (2010) (discussing proxy access and the Section’s 
grant of great discretion to the SEC in delineating such access).  While stating that § 972 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act did not require the SEC to engage in rulemaking, it recognized that the provision 
gives the SEC wide latitude in terms of proxy access.  Id. at 146.  The report explains that “[t]he 
Committee feels that it is proper for shareholders, as the owners of the corporation, to have the right 
to nominate candidates for the Board using the issuer’s proxy under limited circumstances.”  Id.  It 
then proceeds to quote from the testimony of several hearing witnesses enthusiastically supporting 
proxy access.  Id. at 146–47. 
162. See id. at 146 (“The authority gives the SEC wide latitude in setting the terms of such 
proxy access. . . .  If the SEC proposes rules, interested persons can offer their views on the 
appropriateness of proposed regulatory terms in the public comment process.  The Committee feels 
that it is proper for shareholders, as the owners of the corporation, to have the right to nominate 
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fault of Business Roundtable was failing to note this distinction from statutes 
at issue in its prior holdings, where Congress had not spoken directly to the 
topic of greater independence (except for the forty percent it had already 
required in the Investment Company Act163) or whether indexed annuities 
should be deemed securities. 
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis, by focusing exclusively on the broad policy 
question that Congress had taken off the table, is misdirected.  By enacting 
Dodd-Frank, Congress embraced the broader concept of shareholder access, 
leaving it to the SEC to identify how that vision is to be achieved.  So 
viewed, the D.C. Circuit’s review most appropriately should have been 
confined to the details of the proposal, such as the three-percent- and three-
year-ownership requirements.  As a consequence, the D.C. Circuit has not 
only flaunted the Review Standard, but has also essentially invalidated the 
will of Congress. 
The issue raised in Business Roundtable turned on much finer (indeed, 
technical) points for which we might expect there would be a much stronger 
case for deference to the SEC since Congress had taken the larger policy 
question off the table.  But, no doubt blinded by its own precedents, the D.C. 
Circuit failed to note the distinction and failed to focus on the real question 
posed by Rule 14a-11: whether that rule was within the authority delegated 
by Congress to the SEC.  The question then would have been the more 
indefinite inquiry regarding why three years, three percent, and only a 
distinct minority of the board were the applicable metrics for carrying out 
Congress’s will under the Review Standard.  The following discussion 
suggests how questions such as these are to be considered under the Review 
Standard. 
As seen, there are four factors the Commission is to consider in its 
rulemaking: investor protection, efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.  The operative verb in the Review Standard is “consider,” so that 
there is no necessity that the Commission find or ensure or conclude that the 
proposed rule satisfies each of these factors.164  As seen in our discussion of 
the legislative history, the rejection of the Senate’s version of the Review 
Standard, and the later enactment of a different standard for the CFTC while 
simultaneously appending the Standard to the Investment Advisers Act, 
support the view that Congress chose “consider” advisedly.165  “Consider,” 
rather than “find” or “conclude,” is inherently necessary for regulation 
pursuant to a multifactor approach like the one embraced in the Review 
Standard since in the complex area of financial regulation, any regulatory 
action is likely to fail under one or more of the factors. 
 
candidates for the Board using the issuer’s proxy under limited circumstances.”); supra notes 62–64 
and accompanying text. 
163. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a–10(a) (2006). 
164. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text. 
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The tension surrounding proxy access is an example of the problematic 
features of the Review Standard’s embrace of these four factors.  Most 
certainly shareholder access raises costs for a corporation which, having 
taken the first step to nominate through its board a management slate that it 
believes would best serve the corporate interest, must, when confronted with 
competition, take up the corporation’s nominees’ cause.  That is, when 
confronted with an opposition slate through the proxy access provision, the 
corporation’s management will not abandon its nominees, but will increase 
its efforts to ensure that the board-nominated nominees are elected.  This 
necessarily means that a contest between the two slates will result; hence, 
there will be additional costs to the corporation.  And, if the insurgents are 
elected, the corporation may well find their costs will be borne by the 
corporation, i.e., costs on costs.166  There is modest evidence regarding the 
amount of these costs when only a minority of the board seats is at stake, 
which was the most that was permitted by Rule 14a-11.167  Note here that the 
benefits of the proxy access rule, to be sure, are difficult to quantify, but the 
costs will be evident in the incremental campaign expenditures made by the 
corporation.  Thus, on the efficiency factor, the status quo likely gets the nod; 
the board controls the nominating process, thus reducing costs and 
uncertainty of outcome.168 
Another way of stating this is that democracy in any form is more costly 
than a less-democratic means of operation, such as the self-perpetuating 
board.  Competition for board seats likely produces benefits: a fuller 
discussion of the candidates’ relative strength and their vetting, on average, 
might be expected to produce better qualified directors.  That is, proxy access 
is about competition for board seats, so why would efficiency not be an easy 
factor to satisfy for this initiative?  It is not easy to satisfy if the Review 
Standard’s referent is not competition for board seats, but making the 
industry in which the issuer operates more competitive.  This illustrates the 
 
166. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (2011) (authorizing bylaws providing reimbursement of 
proxy contest expenses incurred in connection with the election of directors). 
167. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, 
Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,668, 56,675 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, and 249) (stating that 
Rule 14a-11 cannot be used by a shareholder seeking to change control of the company).  Rule 14a-
11 was struck down by the D.C. Circuit shortly after it was enacted.  Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 
F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing the costs of Rule 14a-11 and holding that the SEC 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not assessing the “economic effects of [this] new rule”). 
168. Broadly speaking, it is on this point that commentators appear united in their 
condemnation of proxy access, believing that broader interests and long-term objectives pursued by 
the board will be compromised by interests groups seeking short-term and narrower objectives.  See, 
e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 653, 690 (2010) (“[S]hareholder empowerment will make it much more difficult for 
a good board of directors to resist pressures to manage to the market.”); Lisa Fairfax, Delaware’s 
New Proxy Access: Much Ado About Nothing?, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 87, 92 (2009) 
(“[G]ranting all shareholders access to the proxy statement could increase the influence of 
shareholders with narrow or special interests . . . .”). 
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amorphous quality, indeed open-endedness, of not just this factor but the 
entire spectrum of factors in the Review Standard. 
Moving to the final factor, we might therefore easily conclude that 
proxy access is at best neutral on capital formation—gains in lowering the 
cost of capital associated with improved governance might easily be offset, 
on average, by the additional costs associated with proxy access.  Here the 
certainty of costs is likely to be more compelling than the nonmeasurable 
benefit.  Since proxy access can result in nominees chosen outside the 
otherwise watchful eye of the CEO, such access can be understood—as it is 
indeed championed by its proponents—to protect investors.  But it is a 
protection that has costs, which are negatives in the efficiency and 
competition realms.  Thus, an assessment under the Review Standard on 
proxy access—or for that matter most any other regulatory initiative—is 
unlikely to always be supportable under each of the four considerations. 
When it fails under some of the criteria and squeaks by on others, 
should this cause the agency to withdraw from the initiative?  As seen earlier, 
the only clear statement on this by Congress when it enacted the Review 
Standard in the NSMIA was that the historical concern of shareholder 
protection remained inviolable.169  This seems sensible; a rule that does not 
advance investor interests but is otherwise efficient, competitive, and 
promotes the aggregation of capital would be hard for the SEC to embrace.  
But more importantly, by choosing the verb “consider,” Congress clearly 
called on the SEC to mediate across the four factors.  What is required, as 
seen earlier, is a thoughtful exploration of how the four factors are likely to 
interact if the initiative is adopted.  We believe the SEC may better be able to 
satisfy the “hard look” review, even one closely scrutinizing its assessment 
of costs and benefits, through pursuing three straightforward strategies: stop 
concluding, stage any sweeping initiative, and scale regulation. 
A. “Consider,” Not Conclude—Analytical, Not Econometrical 
Dirty Harry reminds us “[a] man’s got to know his limitations.”170  This 
may well be a lesson more easily learned by the SEC than the D.C. Circuit; 
in any case, as the initiating party, the SEC should try to control the terrain 
on which the jousting will occur.  Thus, we counsel that the SEC step back 
from practices followed in the past, reorient its approach, and seek to prevail 
by shifting the lens it presents for reviewing its initiatives. 
An important step forward in addressing the new review standard 
adopted by the D.C. Circuit is to reorient the reasoning supporting the 
proposed regulatory initiative.  As developed above, the legislative intent 
surrounding the Review Standard does not require that the SEC either find, 
conclude, or otherwise decide that a proposed regulation improves efficiency, 
 
169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
170. MAGNUM FORCE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1973). 
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competition, or capital formation.171  At the same time, the D.C. Circuit has 
not rebuffed SEC regulatory efforts for failing to fully take each of these 
items into consideration in a detailed manner.  By appearing to conclude, as 
the SEC has, that each of these standards has been met, the SEC sets the 
stage for the reviewing court to test that conclusion against the record.  As 
developed above and in the next two sections, determining the costs and 
benefits for any regulatory initiative is problematic; incompleteness of the 
analysis can easily be found, and has been found.  This seems to be the most 
fundamental conclusion that can be drawn from Chamber of Commerce, 
American Equity, and Business Roundtable. 
But our suggestion is more sweeping than avoiding any “conclusions.”  
We counsel that the SEC in proposing its rules should do so as a lawyer, not 
as an econometrician or empiricist.  There is a decided tone in the D.C. 
Circuit decisions that that court believes it is they, and not the SEC, who are 
the econometricians.  This might be the case, although it is hard to know why 
that could be.  Nonetheless, the SEC appears to have blindly walked into the 
trap it has set for itself by repeatedly framing justifications for the rule on 
costs and benefits.  In a sense, it now finds itself hoisted by its own petard.  
Indeed, recent signs from the agency point to an even greater role for cost–
benefit analysis, and economists generally, in the SEC’s future rulemaking 
attempts.172 
Decidedly lacking in the supporting releases that accompanied each of 
the initiatives successfully challenged in the trilogy of cases reviewed in this 
Article were tightly reasoned arguments and judgments respecting how the 
rule actually performed under each of the factors of the Review Standard.  A 
case in point is the governance rules adopted under the Investment Company 
Act that were struck down in Chamber of Commerce.  The econometrics for 
assessing governance requirements on firm performance and value are 
extraordinarily problematic.  For example, is governance value created in all 
operating conditions, when the firm is in crisis, or never? 
Rather than wringing its hands over such questions, as the SEC did in its 
adopting release, we believe it might have been wiser to have built a 
qualitative case for the rule (rather than attempting the impossible by trying 
to build a quantitative case): First, explain that the world of mutual funds is 
 
171. See supra notes 74–98 and accompanying text. 
172. In a recently circulated internal memo, the SEC appears to have instructed its staff to 
provide even greater economic analysis of its proposed rules by involving economists early and 
often in the rulemaking process and requiring economists’ approval before adopting a final rule.  
Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Looks to Economists for Legal Cover, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-sec-economic-analysis-idUSBRE83F16W20120416.  
See generally The SEC’s Aversion to Cost–Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter SEC’s Aversion to Cost–Benefit Analysis] (statement of 
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (discussing in general terms a recently 
circulated internal “guidance” on SEC rulemaking). 
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inherently incestuous (where the outside advisor essentially handpicks the 
parties to negotiate the self-dealing arrangements for which the SEC was 
proposing more independence), then, explain in a purely analytical manner 
how the increased independence mandated by the rule would strengthen the 
fund–advisor negotiations that are otherwise infected with conflicts of 
interest.  The point is that not all rules readily lend themselves to rigorous 
cost–benefit analysis.  Far better in most cases to make the analytical case 
that identifies the problem and carefully explain how the highly textured rule 
addresses the problems posed.173 
In this context, the rule’s probable impact on efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation could be addressed analytically and not 
econometrically.  Instead, the most detailed analysis in the rules challenged 
in Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable was that of the costs and 
benefits associated with the rule.  Insufficient attention was given to the host 
of variables that could impact a rule’s possible effects under each of these 
factors.  Thus, we counsel that the SEC would better expend its efforts by 
clearly stating just what the objective sought by a given rule is, why the rule 
as written accomplishes that objective, the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of other approaches considered or suggested by the comments, what the 
possible impact on each of the Review Standard’s factors might be, and what 
variables are unknown (and unknowable a priori) in making those estimates. 
If the SEC thoroughly set forth its reasons bearing on how a regulatory 
initiative, based on available information, would likely impact efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation, it would not be framing the issue as 
whether, for example, efficiency results from the rule, but rather whether the 
SEC has developed a record supporting its close consideration of a range of 
potential inputs bearing on the rule’s impact on efficiency.  After taking a 
similar approach for each of the four factors of the Review Standard, it could 
then justify why it is that the rule, as adopted, is an advisable course.  This 
approach also allows for the agency, implicitly, to assign distinctly different 
weights to each of the Review Standard’s factors, mindful that the sine qua 
non of any rulemaking, as stated in the NSMIA amendment to the Review 
Standard, is investor protection. 
Costs and benefits will be part of this analysis, but conclusions as to 
each should be avoided.  And, when the SEC does undertake analysis, albeit 
without “concluding,” of costs and benefits it believes flow from a proposed 
rule, the SEC should carefully and precisely identify discrete aspects of the 
 
173. The SEC appears to be taking small steps towards the approach we recommend: Chairman 
Schapiro recently testified to Congress that in the future, when a proposed rule’s costs and benefits 
cannot reasonably be quantified, the adopting release should provide: (1) some explanation of why 
that is the case, and (2) a “qualitative analysis of the likely economic consequences of the proposed 
rule.”  SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 172, at 16 (statement of Mary Schapiro, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 
1842 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:1811 
 
rule it included to minimize potential costs and, likewise, should identify 
provisions of the rule likely to maximize the benefits of the rule. 
B. Staging Regulation 
For decades, the exclusive domain for trading in stocks listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange was the NYSE.174  This was not because of any 
natural forces; it was because NYSE’s Rule 390 prohibited off-board 
trading.175  This monopoly, comfortable for the NYSE and its members but 
less comfortable for others, began to weaken when the SEC, in June 1980, 
adopted Rule 19c-3, permitting securities listed after April 26, 1979, to be 
traded elsewhere.176  In this way, the SEC created natural conditions for 
observing the pricing and general market effects for securities that were 
 
174. See Tai-Kong Kam et al., Competition Among Markets: The Repeal of Rule 390, 27 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1711, 1712 (2003) (stating that Rule 390’s prohibition on trading stocks off of the 
exchange dated back to the 18th century). 
175. Id. 
176. The table for challenging the New York Stock Exchange’s off-board trading restrictions 
was set by amendments to the 1975 Securities Act that, among other features, directed the SEC to 
“facilitate the establishment of a national market system.”  Securities Act Amendments of 1975, 
Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7, 89 Stat. 97, 112 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2006)).  
Congress also required the SEC “to review any and all rules of national securities exchanges which 
limit or condition the ability of members to effect transactions in securities otherwise than on such 
exchanges” and report its finding to Congress as well as commence proceedings “to amend any 
such rule imposing a burden on competition which does not appear to the Commission to be 
necessary or appropriate.”  Id. at § 7(c)(4)(A).  The industry resisted the notion that competition was 
desirable or would be enhanced by relaxing the off-board trading rule.  See Wall Street Firms 
Defend Rules Favoring Members of Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1975, at 67 (describing a 
letter by twenty-two Wall Street firms expressing their uniform opinion that the benefits of relaxing 
the off-board rule would be dwarfed by the resulting costs).  While the SEC did propose Rule 19c-2, 
which would have repealed the restriction outright, Announcement of Proceeding Regarding 
Exchange Off-Board Trading Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 13,662, 12 SEC DIGEST 947 
(proposed June 23, 1977), it ultimately withdrew that proposal and adopted Rule 19c-3, which 
tested the impact of removing the off-board trading restrictions by holding that securities listed after 
April 26, 1979 would not be subject to that restriction.  Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange 
Act Release No. 16,888, 45 Fed. Reg. 41,125, 41,127 (June 18, 1980) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) 
(“The Commission . . . believes that the Rule is justified by its experimental value which will 
further the purposes of the Act by providing actual experience with the effects of concurrent over-
the-counter and exchange trading.”). 
 Further experimentation occurred, albeit as a result of pressure from Congress, when the SEC 
initiated for thirty companies, during a test period of six months, a linkage among seven stock 
exchanges and the OTC market to see if their trading would move away from their prime-listed 
market.  Electronic Link of 7 Exchanges; OTC Will Begin, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1982, at 5. 
 The NYSE repealed Rule 390 in December 1999 and the SEC approved its actions in 2000.  
NYSE Rulemaking: Order Approving Proposal to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange Act 
Release No. 42,758, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,175, 30,176 (May 10, 2000).  The repeal had the broad support 
of Wall Street, which saw business being drawn away from the exchanges by the various 
proprietary electronic communications networks where trades could be executed more quickly and 
cheaply than on the NYSE.  See Robert Sales, The Quest to Kill 390, WALL ST. & TECH., 
Dec. 1999, at 37, 37 (contending that executives of the largest broker-dealers on Wall Street had all 
vocalized opposition to Rule 390).  By then, Rule 390 covered only 30% of the NYSE-listed issuers 
who represented approximately half of the exchange’s volume.  Id. at 38. 
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traded exclusively on the NYSE and those that were traded in multiple 
venues, including the NYSE. 
More recently, the SEC purposely created a climate for a natural 
experiment when, in May 2005, it commenced a pilot program whereby one-
third of the Russell 3000 Index constituent stocks with high levels of 
liquidity were exempted from the Uptick Rule.177  The Uptick Rule, former 
Exchange Act Rule 10a-1, was designed to prevent short sellers from 
accelerating a declining market by providing that a listed security might be 
sold short only at either a price above where the immediately preceding sale 
was effected (the plus tick) or at the last price if it was higher than the last 
different price (zero-plus tick).178  With very limited exceptions, short sales 
were prohibited on the minus tick or zero-minus ticks.  Collectively these are 
known as the Uptick Rule.179 
Both Rule 19c-3 and the pilot program preceded significant changes in 
the operating rules of trading markets.  The Uptick Rule had been a feature of 
American securities regulatory policy since 1938;180 the bar to off-board 
trading has an even longer history, since exchanges historically embodied 
this anticompetitive feature.181  Thus, the SEC, perhaps timidly, but certainly 
wisely, tested the waters before launching those reform efforts.  This not only 
made good politics, but made better-informed regulatory policy. 
The most obvious benefit of staging is that it informs the ultimately 
embraced regulatory policy.  The SEC’s actions with both Rule 19c-3 and the 
pilot program created a natural experiment by which the impact of differing 
 
177. See Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 50,103, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,008, 48,012–13 
(Aug. 6, 2004) (adopting proposed rule 202T, allowing the SEC to establish a pilot program “to 
suspend any short sale price test for such securities and for such time periods as the Commission 
deems necessary or appropriate”).  The one-third were chosen by selecting every third company on 
a list, starting with the second company.  Lynn Bai, The Uptick Rule of Short Sale Regulation: Can 
It Alleviate Downward Price Pressure from Negative Earnings Shocks?, 5 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 1, 11 
(2008).  This provided a control group of the companies not included in the pilot study sample.  Id. 
at 5. 
178. For an overview of the history of the Uptick Rule, see generally Charles M. Jones, 
Shorting Restrictions: Revisiting the 1930s, 47 FIN. REV. 1 (2012). 
179. See Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule 
and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 800–01 
(1989) (“The uptick rule, Rule 10a-1, implemented in the wake of the 1929 crash and changed only 
slightly since then, states that a ‘short sale can only occur at a price above (“price tick”) the 
immediate sale price, or at a price equal to the price of the most immediate sale if the most recent 
price change was positive.’”).  For critics of the revisions to the Uptick Rule, see generally David P. 
McCaffrey, Review of the Policy Debate over Short Sale Regulation During the Market Crisis, 73 
ALB. L. REV. 483 (2010); Melissa W. Palombo, Note, The Short-Changing of Investors: Why a 
Short Sale Price Test Rule Is Necessary in Today’s Markets, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1447 (2010). 
180. Charles R. Schwab, Restore the Uptick Rule, Restore Confidence, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122878208553589809.html. 
181. See ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, MICRO MARKETS: A MARKET STRUCTURE APPROACH TO 
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 386 (2010) (“Fixed commissions and off-board trading restrictions 
were established by an accord known as the Buttonwood Tree Agreement that was signed by 24 
securities brokers on May 17, 1792 . . . .”). 
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regulatory treatments could be empirically tested.182  Not only did this make 
the careers of many an academic (for whom the currency of the realm is a 
working paper focused on the econometric analysis of a real problem), but 
that work produced valuable input to the regulator, and free of charge.  To be 
sure, the SEC has a very able and relatively well-supported group of 
economists who regularly opine on the costs and benefits of a proposed rule.  
But, one empirical study rarely can be expected to reflect the full field of 
possible inputs on a matter.  The SEC’s budget is limited in the number of 
studies it can launch, and the internal time constraints for the agency to 
consider a single issue all weigh in favor of creating an environment for 
others to carry out the empirical inquiry, inviting the assistance of tenure- 
and chair-bound empiricists. 
Staging has another virtue, particularly when the initiative is something 
of a paradigm shift, like the governance proposals at issue in Chamber of 
Commerce.  Staging fosters an environment where much more information 
will be at hand before the final regulatory step is taken.  Moreover, moving 
forward cautiously with a pilot group of firms is most consistent with the 
“consider” standard, since that strategy is designed to better inform the 
agency of the expected costs and benefits of moving forward. 
As discussed earlier, costs loom large in the regulatory quilt because 
they are more tangible and because the cost part of the regulatory equation 
poses few doubts about correlation versus causation.183  Assessing benefits is 
quite the opposite, particularly ex ante.  Ex parte research on both of these 
might well be seen as more credible, and what is observed ex post is likely to 
be received as even more credible than what is conjectured ex ante.  Discrete 
staging allows evidence to be gathered as to costs, and allows the researcher 
to gather information as to the probable benefits as well. 
 
182. E.g., Bai, supra note 177 (conducting an empirical analysis of the effects of the Uptick 
Rule); Kalman J. Cohen & Robert M. Conroy, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Rule 19c-3, 33 
J.L. & ECON. 277 (1990) (studying the effects of Rule 19c-3); Karl B. Diether et al., It’s SHO Time!  
Short-Sale Price Tests and Market Quality, 64 J. FIN. 37 (2009) (examining the effects of the 
suspension of short-sale price tests).  The SEC also studied the effects of the experiment.  E.g., DIV. 
MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC, Study III: Market Fragmentation, Competition, and Regulation, in 
SEC MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS III-10 
(1994) (finding a “limited amount of internalization” resulting from the removal of some off-board 
restrictions and concluding that the Division was “not surprise[d] that studies both have failed to 
show a strong negative effect from Rule 19c-3 or strong evidence that the additional competition in 
these stocks has appreciably improved their markets”); OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT SALE PRICE RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE REGULATION SHO 
PILOT 4–5 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf 
(analyzing the economic impact of the SHO pilot). 
183. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
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C. Can the Public Interest Be Scaled? 
Regulatory initiatives are frequently confronted by the complaint that 
“one size does not fit all.”184  The complaint in fact seeks scaling regulation, 
so that larger and more complicated firms are subject to requirements that are 
different from those of smaller, less complex business organizations.  In the 
securities regulation area, scaling is typically associated with more regulation 
for bigger firms and less for smaller firms.185  Moreover, several initiatives 
embraced by the Dodd-Frank Act expressly call on the SEC, when issuing 
rules pursuant to the Act’s provisions, to consider whether the burdens would 
be disproportionately greater on smaller companies. 
There are at least a couple of reasons why regulation, particularly 
disclosure-oriented regulation, might pose greater burdens on smaller 
companies than larger ones.  First, financial reporting, and indeed, a good 
deal of regulation generally, has a high fixed-cost component, so that a 
substantial part of the cost of compliance is invariant, or nearly so, to firm 
size and complexity.  Second, firms that are large in terms of their total assets 
or revenues frequently involve complex organization structures and have 
operations in multiple locations that are sometimes on different continents.  
Complexity poses its own challenges to the efficacy of the firm’s reporting 
system so that greater attention to the internal financial controls is necessary.  
In contrast, in a smaller, less complex entity, the senior management has a 
greater awareness of daily operations so that there is less need for the 
procedures employed in larger, more complex organizations for protecting 
the integrity of internal financial reporting.  Thus, a few of the disclosure 
demands in SEC Regulation S-K, for example, are less demanding for 
smaller companies than for larger ones.186  On the other hand, SEC rules 
 
184. See Amy Feldman, Surviving Sarbanes-Oxley, INC. MAG., Sept. 2005, at 132, 137 (“Many 
observers believe there ought to be different rules for companies of different sizes, or at least clearer 
guidelines on how small companies should apply the rules.”); Public statement from Marshall E. 
Blume & Chester S. Spratt, Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm., The Equity Markets: One Size Does 
Not Fit All (Feb. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.aei.org/files/2010/02/22/Statement%20No.%20287.pdf (reviewing the SEC’s proposed 
rules, and noting that “the trades of small retail investors and institutional investors are 
fundamentally different and should not be viewed as interchangeable”). 
185. See Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Twelfth Annual A.A. 
Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law (Oct. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch102711tap.htm (“[T]he federal securities laws have long 
recognized the need to be measured, as there is a tradition of scaling federal securities regulation in 
important respects to provide small businesses relief from select burdens that may be especially 
onerous for them.”). 
186. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(h) (2011) (setting out lesser reporting obligations); id. at 
§ 229.201(e) (allowing for the election of an appropriate index to use in the preparation of reports); 
id. at § 229.303(a) (“[T]he discussion shall focus on each relevant, reportable segment or other 
subdivision of the business and on the registrant as a whole.”).  Most recently, Dodd-Frank excused 
non-accelerated filers, those with a market capitalization (excluding shares of affiliates) less than 
$75 million from the auditor attestation of management’s assessment of internal controls.  See Press 
Release, American Accounting Association, Reviled Though It Has Been, Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
Section 404 Substantially Reduces Corporate Financial Misstatements, Study Finds (Nov. 16, 
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grant many regulatory dispensations to very large companies because their 
shares are believed to trade in deep markets, with broad analyst coverage, 
and with significant institutional ownership.187  Hence, there is a history of 
scaling of regulation under the federal securities laws. 
Scaling regulation so as to provide important dispensations to smaller 
companies immediately confronts serious public interest concerns because 
studies continue to reflect, as captured above, that there is a higher frequency 
of financial fraud and, more generally, reporting weaknesses in smaller 
companies than in larger companies.  That is, reporting problems are in a 
sense reverse-scaled.  Small companies pose a greater frequency of risk to 
investors than do larger companies.  Nonetheless, scaling has to some extent 
the same virtues as staging.  Each allows something of a test period before 
standards are imposed.  In the case of small issuers, they enjoy lightened 
regulation until more is learned about whether their regulatory burdens 
should be increased.  Scaling also communicates not just deliberateness on 
the part of the SEC, but discreteness that is consistent with the Review 
Standard.  With both staging and scaling, regulation would be more 
evolutionary, which should have its positive impact when a staged or scaled 
rule is challenged under the Review Standard. 
V. Conclusion 
So what to make of the mischief of Chamber of Commerce and Business 
Roundtable?  Their author has now left the bench, but the issue remains: how 
close a review is the court to undertake of SEC rules?  As matters now stand, 
a good deal of uncertainty surrounds any SEC rulemaking that engenders the 
ire of the regulated.  Indeed, we repeatedly hear the rattling of appellate-
review sabers by industry groups.188  We have gone to some effort to make 
 
2010), available at http://aaahq.org/newsroom/Sarbanes-Oxley%27sSection404.htm (“[T]his year’s 
Dodd-Frank financial-reform bill permanently exempts companies with less than $75-million 
capitalization from a key provision of 404 that requires an outside auditor to attest annually to 
firms’ internal-control evaluations.”). 
187. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10(f), .101(h), .301(c), .407(g) (2011) (reducing or eliminating 
many of Regulation S-K’s reporting requirements for smaller companies); Securities Offering 
Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8501, Exchange Act Release No. 50,624, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,649, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,392, 67,396–97 (proposed Nov. 17, 2004) (codified as 
amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243 and 274) (justifying the SEC’s decision to 
provide large companies (well-known seasoned issuers) with greater disclosure and registration 
flexibility by stating that issuers with high levels of market capitalization also tend to have high 
levels of analyst coverage and institutional ownership, and, thus, high levels of market scrutiny); 
Daniel J. Morrissey, The Securities Act at Its Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a Robust 
Registration Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 749, 763 (2009) (observing that the SEC rules give 
large companies (seasoned issuers and well-known seasoned issuers) more freedom to conduct 
offering activity during the registration process). 
188. See, e.g., Groups, Stressing Economic Impact, Ask SEC to Host Roundtable on Pay Ratio 
Rulemaking, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 153 (2012) (detailing the requests for the SEC to better 
consider economic impact in conducting pay-ratio rulemaking); Yin Wilczek, Democratic 
Lawmakers Urge SEC to Adopt ‘Strong’ Resource Extraction Disclosure Rule, 44 SEC. REG. & L. 
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the point that Congress and the Supreme Court do not support the reasoning 
in either of these opinions.  The strategies advanced in Part IV may smooth 
the path in future regulatory efforts.  We are hopeful that the course of action 
we counsel, particularly that of staging and scaling, will be more than a mild 
palliative.  We also believe the purposes of our suggestions are broader than 
sliding a rule past the D.C. Circuit; we believe each of the suggestions will 
lead to better regulations.  With regulation anchored in the protection of 
investors and the public interest, much more is at stake in SEC rulemaking 
than just getting approval of the D.C. Circuit.  But those greater goals depend 
on surviving a challenge to the rule the SEC has crafted to serve the public 
interest. 
 
REP. 256 (2012) (reporting that American Petroleum Institute’s comment letter was a roadmap for 
appellate review if the SEC adopts any rules related to carrying out the Dodd-Frank mandate for 
disclosures related to payments made by exploration companies to foreign governments); Yin 
Wilczek, Industry Calls on SEC to Re-Assess Economic Impact of Conflict Minerals Rule, 43 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. 2256 (2011) (speculating that despite a statutory mandate the SEC would face stiff 
challenges with the new rule related to conflict minerals mandated by Dodd-Frank). 
